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| ONR Site Report  Sellafield Ltd – Sellafield |



ONR Site Report

Sellafield Ltd - Sellafield

Report for period: 1 April 2025 – 30 September 2025

Authored by: Nominated Site Inspector

Approved by: Superintending Inspector

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Foreword

This report is issued as part of ONR's commitment to make information about inspection and regulatory activities relating to the above site available to the public. Reports are distributed to members for the West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group (WCSSG) and are also available on the ONR website (<http://www.onr.org.uk/llc/>).

Site inspectors from ONR usually attend West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group meetings where these reports are presented and will respond to any questions raised there. Any person wishing to inquire about matters covered by this report should contact ONR.

Contents

[1. Inspections 8](#_Toc124509190)

[2. Routine Matters 9](#_Toc124509191)

[3. Non-Routine Matters 20](#_Toc124509192)

[4. Regulatory Activity 21](#_Toc124509193)

[5. News from ONR 23](#_Toc124509194)

[6. Contacts 23](#_Toc124509195)

List of abbrevations:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| AHF | Active Handling Facility |
| ALARP | As Low As Reasonably Practicable |
| BEP | Box Encapsulation Plant |
| BEPPS/DIF | Box Encapsulation Plant Product Store/Direct Import Facility |
| CA | Competent Authority |
| CDM | Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015 |
| CFSI | Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items |
| COMAH | Control Of Major Accident Hazard (Regulations 2015) |
| COSHH | Control Of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations |
| DSEAR | Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations |
| EA | Environment Agency |
| EDNUP | Electrical Distribution Network Upgrade Project |
| EPS | Encapsulation Product Store |
| ERA | Enhanced Regulatory Attention |
| FGFL | First Generation Finishing Line |
| FGMSP | First Generation Magnox Storage Pond |
| HALES | Highly Active Liquor Evaporation and Storage |
| HAST | Highly Active Storage Tank |
| HLWP | High Level Waste Plants |
| HPCP | Hold Point Control Plan |
| HSWA74 | Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 |
| ILW | Intermediate Level Waste |
| INES | International Nuclear Event Scale |
| IRR17 | Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017 |
| ISF | Interim Storage Facility |
| KDM | Key Decommissioning Milestone |
| LAEMG | Low Active Effluent Management Group |
| LC | Licence Conditions |
| LOLER | Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998 |
| MEP | Magnox Encapsulation Plant |
| MER | Magnox East River |
| MHSWR99 | Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 |
| MRF | Magnox Reprocessing Facility |
| MSSS | Magnox Swarf Storage Silo |
| NDA | Nuclear Decommissioning Authority |
| NIA65 | Nuclear Installation Act 1965 |
| NSH&S | Nuclear Site Health and Safety |
| OFSG | Oxide Fuel Storage Group |
| ONR | Office for Nuclear Regulation |
| OR | Operating Rule |
| PFCS | Pile Fuel Cladding Silo |
| PFSP | Pile Fuel Storage Pond |
| PPP | Programme and Project Partner |
| PSR | Periodic Safety Review |
| PSSR | Pressure Systems Safety Regulations |
| REPPIR | Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations |
| RCW | Recirculating Cooling Water |
| RI | Regulatory Issue |
| SCIE | Sellafield Compliance, Inspection and Enforcement |
| SEMS | Sellafield Enterprise Management System |
| SEP2 | Silo Emptying Plant No2 |
| SFAIRP | So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable |
| SFM | Spent Fuel Management |
| SMF | Silo Maintenance Facility |
| SNM | Special Nuclear Materials |
| SQEP | Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person |
| SSB | Self Shielded Boxes |
| SRP | Sellafield Product and Residue Store Retreatment Plant |
| THORP | Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant |
| WTR | Waste Transfer Route |
| WVP | Waste Vitrification Plant |

**Licence conditions**

1 Interpretation

2 Marking of the site boundary

3 Control of property transactions

4 Restrictions on nuclear matter on the site

5 Consignment of nuclear matter

6 Documents, records, authorities and certificates

7 Incidents on the site

8 Warning notices

9 Instructions to persons on the site

10 Training

11 Emergency arrangements

12 Duly authorised and other suitably qualified and experienced persons

13 Nuclear safety committee

14 Safety documentation

15 Periodic review

16 Site plans, designs and specifications

17 Management systems

18 Radiological protection

19 Construction or installation of new plant

20 Modification to design of plant under construction

21 Commissioning

22 Modification or experiment on existing plant

23 Operating rules

24 Operating instructions

25 Operational records

26 Control and supervision of operations

27 Safety mechanisms, devices and circuits

28 Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing

29 Duty to carry out tests, inspections and examinations

30 Periodic shutdown

31 Shutdown of specified operations

32 Accumulation of radioactive waste

33 Disposal of radioactive waste

34 Leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste

35 Decommissioning

36 Organisational capability

# Inspections

## Date(s) of Inspection

The ONR site inspectors made inspections on the following dates during the report period 1 April 2025 – 30 September 2025:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **April 2025** | **May 2025** | **June 2025** | **July 2025** | **August 2025** | **September 2025** |
| **Special Nuclear Materials (SNM)** |  | 21 | 11-12 | 9 |  | 10 |
| **Retrievals** |  | 19-21 |  |  |  | 9-11 |
| **Remediation** | 8 |  | 11 | 8 |  |  |
| **Spent Fuel Services (SFS)** |  |  |  | 9 |  |  |
| **Spent Fuel Management (SFM) -HALES and HLWP** |  |  | 18 |  |  | 10 |
| **Site Management** |  | 14 |  | 9 | 20 |  |

# Routine Matters

## Inspections

Inspections are undertaken as part of the process for monitoring compliance with:

* the conditions attached by ONR to the nuclear site licence granted under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (NIA65) (as amended);
* the Energy Act 2013;
* the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (HSWA74); and
* regulations made under HSWA74, for example the Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017 (IRR17) and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (MHSWR99).

The inspections entail monitoring the licensee’s actions on the site in relation to incidents, operations, maintenance, projects, modifications, safety case changes and any other matters that may affect safety. The licensee is required to make and implement adequate arrangements under the conditions attached to the licence in order to ensure legal compliance. Inspections seek to judge both the adequacy of these arrangements and their implementation.

In this period, routine inspections of Sellafield covered the following:

**Special Nuclear Materials Value Stream (SNM)**

**SNM North**

Two planned compliance inspections were conducted to confirm Sellafield Ltd’s compliance with its arrangements for Licence Conditions (LCs) 23, 27, 28, 34 and 35. ONR judged that compliance with the LCs was adequate and awarded Green (no formal action) inspection ratings for LC 23, 27, 34 and 35. ONR judged that compliance with LC 28 was inadequate and awarded an Amber (seek improvements) inspection rating. A Level 3 regulatory issue has also been raised to monitor the resolution of this shortfall, which is ongoing.

**SNM South**

Three planned compliance inspections were conducted to confirm Sellafield Ltd’s compliance with its arrangements for LC 4, 32 and 35, and compliance with the Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017. ONR judged that compliance was adequate and awarded a Green (no formal action) inspection rating.

**Retrievals Value Stream**

Legacy Ponds – First Generation Magnox Storage Pond (FGMSP) and Pile Fuel Storage Pond (PFSP)

Two inspections were undertaken at Legacy Ponds in this period.

An Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017 (IRR17) compliance inspection covering both FGMSP and PFSP was undertaken in May 2025. This was to gain assurance that Sellafield Ltd are compliant with the Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017 (IRR17) and associated Sellafield Ltd procedures and standards for work associated with operations within FGMSP and PFSP.

The inspectors judged that FGMSP was compliant with IRR17 and rated the inspection green (no formal action). The inspectors identified shortfalls at PFSP relating to waste and equipment management and boot barrier standards. The inspectors judged that the facility was not compliant with two of the regulations sampled under IRR17, and rated the inspection amber, with specific shortfalls against IRR Regulation 9 - Restriction of Exposure and IRR17 Regulation 18 - local rules and radiation protection supervisors. The inspectors raised one level 3 issue in relation to the inspection and provided regulatory advice and guidance on several areas from observations on both facilities. The regulatory issue is now being tracked as part of routine business.

An operational records compliance inspection was undertaken in September 2025. This inspection sought to confirm Sellafield Ltd have finalised and implemented improved arrangements for operational records at FGMSP and are compliant with LC25 and the Nuclear Safeguards Regulations 2019 (NSR19) Regulations 6 and 10. The inspectors judged for LC25 NSR19 Regulations 6 and 10, green (no formal action) inspection ratings were appropriate. The inspectors provided advice and guidance arising from the inspection, which were accepted.

Legacy Silos - Magnox Swarf Storage Silo (MSSS) and Pile Fuel Cladding Silo (PFCS)

During financial year 2025/2026 we have committed to undertaking themed inspections on both legacy silos to gain regulatory confidence that Sellafield Ltd can implement credible plans to deliver timely high hazard and risk reduction. The themed inspections cover two topics: plant and equipment, and people and process.

Initial themed inspections covering people and process were undertaken in May at both MSSS and PFCS. Likewise, initial themed inspections covering plant and equipment were undertaken in September, at both MSSS and PFCS. These inspections were not rated but have been used as a means of identifying areas for further follow-up. Follow-up inspections at both legacy silos will be taken later this financial year and will be reported in the next WCSSG report.

**Remediation Value Stream**

Magnox Remediation (MR)

In July 2025 ONR undertook compliance inspections on LC 24, LC26 and IRR17 Specifically:

* Regulation 9 - Restriction of exposure
* Regulation 15 - Information, instruction and training
* Regulation 16 - Co-operation between employers
* Regulation 17 - Designation of controlled or supervised areas
* Regulation 18 - Local rules and radiation protection supervisors

The inspection was supported by Human Factors and Radiological Protection and Criticality Specialist inspectors. The findings for the areas inspected were all rated green and no formal actions were raised.

We have has also continued to engage with Sellafield Ltd on the floc removal from legacy tanks. During this reporting period we undertook LC26, Nuclear Site Health and Safety and CDM regulations 2015 inspections. The inspection was supported by the Nuclear Site Health and Safety Specialist inspector and the Site Inspector. The inspection team undertook discussions with plant personnel, contractors and a construction site visit. A visit to the Leconfield site to observe the operator training arrangements on a legacy mock-up retrieval tank was also undertaken. The inspections were all rated green with no formal actions taken.

**Spent Fuel Management Value Stream - Highly Active Liquor Evaporation and Storage (HALES) and High Level Waste Plants (HLWP)**

We undertook a readiness inspection to determine if the holdpoint associated with the permission for the “Harwell Flask” lowering operation could be lifted (see Section 4). The inspection was devised to sample the dutyholder's arrangements for:

* the radiological protection measures that are described in the radiological risk assessment
* the measures identified in the lifting plan
* the control of the operation, and contingency plans and allowed an assessment of the personnel, teams, management and supervision of the activities devised to facilitate the project.

ONR was content with the dutyholder’s arrangements for LCs 11, 23, 24, 26, Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998 (LOLER) and IRRs 2017 associated with the Harwell flask recovery proposal and lifted the regulatory holdpoint associated with this activity. This inspection was rated green.

We also undertook an LC22 inspection to sample evidence of the implementation of the Sellafield Ltd arrangements for compliance with LC 22, specifically within the Highly Active Liquor Evaporation and Storage (HALES) facility. The dutyholder, as demonstrated at the HALES facility, has a mature set of arrangements for LC22, and ONR was content that they are being implemented adequately. This inspection was rated green.

**Spent Fuel Services (SFS)**

One inspection was undertaken at the Spent Fuel Service Operating Unit, a licence condition compliance inspection for LC28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing) at the Fuel Storage (North) facilities. This inspection was rated Green..

**LAEMG**

A LC 10,12, and 36 compliance inspection was undertaken at the floc retrieval plant. An amber rating was assigned to each of the LCs inspected. Shortfalls were identified regarding the production and implementation of adequate arrangements for the training of staff who have responsibility for operations which may affect safety. In addition, shortfalls were also observed for the classification of changes to the organisational structure or resources according to their safety significance. We have issued an enforcement letter (see section 4) to highlight the shortfalls observed and raised a level 3 regulatory issues to track the actions within the letter.

**Site Management**

A planned compliance inspection was undertaken of the Sellafield Ltd level 1 safety demonstration exercise (Exercise Gravity). The purpose of the intervention was to evaluate the adequacy of existing arrangements to ensure compliance with LC 11.

Sellafield Ltd demonstrated its emergency arrangements with a severe accident at the High Level Waste Plant. The scenario provided a challenge to the responders with a steam leak, casualties, radiological release and planning for the partial evacuation of site. The scenario also separated the site-wide command and control function between the Main Site Command Facility and Off Site Command Facility. The scenario represented a challenging exercise and ONR welcomes this as such exercises generally provide greater learning opportunities.

Sellafield Ltd adequately demonstrated the application of their emergency arrangements warranting an intervention rating of green (no formal action) for LC11.

A planned compliance inspection was undertaken with a focus on the organisational resilience of Security & Resilience (Operations). The inspection covered LC 11 and LC 36.

The purpose of the intervention was to seek assurance that there was a justified Nuclear Baseline (NB) covering both the emergency preparedness function and emergency response activities with sufficient resources available to respond to any accident or emergency arising on the site.

Sellafield Ltd has established arrangements for determining minimum safe staffing levels (MSSL) to ensure suitable and sufficient personnel are available to respond to emergency events. However, Sellafield Ltd has self-identified systemic inefficiencies and inconsistencies in how these arrangements are defined, applied and maintained.

We found that there was sufficient resources available within the responsibility and management of Security & Resilience to respond to any accident or emergency, as per the OEP, arising on the site. However, the current MSSL process is imprecise and inefficient, reducing the licensee's ability to accurately identify genuine risk gaps arising from absences or vacancies. Therefore the inspection was rated as amber (seek improvement) for LC11 and LC36. An enforcement letter and associated level 3 regulatory issue have been drafted and will be reflected in the next WCSSG report.

**Corporate**

Supply Chain and Quality

We undertook an inspection to seek assurance that Sellafield Ltd.’s supply chain management arrangements, within its Operational Technology Group (OTG), were adequately controlling risks from Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items (CFSI) in line with relevant good practice and regulatory expectations. This was to inform regulatory judgement regarding compliance with relevant statutory provisions and good practice.

The inspection sampled CFSI management improvement and actions taken as a result of a Regulatory Issue identified in 2023. This highlighted shortfalls found in the implementation of Sellafield Ltd.'s arrangements for the procurement of operational technology and information technology and use of “at risk” procurement routes.

The inspection revealed OTG remain in a period of transition regarding its CFSI arrangements and knowledge of Sellafield Ltd. quality arrangements but are committed to work towards alignment with wider enterprise arrangements.

Based on the evidence sampled, ONR concluded that LC 17 (Management systems) was rated as amber and LC 6 (Records) was rated green. One ONR level 4 regulatory issue was raised to capture the identified areas for improvement and track remedial actions, noting that an extant level 3 regulatory issue covered the findings for the amber rated LC17 inspection.

We also carried out an inspection to seek assurance that Sellafield Ltd. and its supplier, Stainless Metalcraft, had implemented adequate supply chain and quality management arrangements associated with the manufacture and supply of Tranche A 3m3 boxes, and to inform a regulatory judgement regarding the licensee’s compliance with relevant statutory provisions and good practice.

Based on the discussions held and evidence sampled during the inspection, examples of good practice were identified which included the management and control of materials, manufacture, deviations and records.

We identified several shortfalls in the adequate deployment of some management system and welding quality management arrangements. Based on the findings of this inspection and evidence sampled, improvements are required to demonstrate the adequate deployment of the Intelligent Customer assurance arrangements. We concluded that LC 17, LC 6 and LC 19 (Construction or installation of new plant) were rated as amber. Areas of good practice were highlighted, and regulatory advice was provided in several areas which will be followed up via routine engagements. Two ONR level 3 regulatory issues were raised to capture the identified areas for improvement and track remedial actions.

A follow up targeted ONR engagement was also held in the reporting period with the Sellafield Ltd. Head of Manufactured Products Organisation (MPO) who are accountable for the delivery of volume manufactured products across the enterprise, including 3m3 boxes. The purpose of the engagement was to feedback on ONR key reflections on the inspection and reiterate the regulatory expectations related to the Sellafield Ltd. Intelligent Customer role.

Members of the public, who would like further information on our inspection activities during the reporting period, can view site Intervention Reports at [www.onr.org.uk/intervention-records](http://www.onr.org.uk./intervention-records) on our website [www.onr.org.uk](http://www.onr.org.uk).

Should you have any queries regarding our inspection activities, please email [contact@onr.gov.uk](mailto:contact@onr.gov.uk).

## Other Work

**Analytical Services**

Analytical Services was placed into significantly enhanced regulatory attention in 2024 and the decision was taken to extend this level of regulatory attention into 2025. Further significant progress has been made during the period that includes continuation of extensive roof repairs, which now sees the facility ahead of its stretch target for completion. In addition, replacement of electrical boards has continued with the facility currently in outage due to the replacement of the main electrical distribution board. Progress on ventilation systems and substantial risk reduction through the removal of legacy gloveboxes has also continued but is currently paused due to the planned outage activities, with work set to continue when the outage completes in October 2025. Significant projects will continue in 2025 and we will continue to seek assurance that the progress seen in 2024 and the first part of 2025 is maintained and sustained. Sellafield Ltd has a number of programme milestones during 2025, 2026 and 2027 that we will use to evidence against a move to enhanced and then routine regulatory attention. Currently there are no concerns around these milestones being met.

**Special Nuclear Materials (SNM)**

Through ONR’s level 1 regulatory issue, we continue to engage and influence Sellafield Ltd to implement the capabilities required for the safe longer term storage of SNM inventory that has been consolidated from Dounreay to Sellafield:

* Sellafield Limited has successfully implemented a capability to allow transfer of two thirds of these SNM packages from interim storage into more modern standards medium-term storage pending retreatment at the Sellafield Product and Residue Store Retreatment Plant (SRP) to prepare it for long term storage. SRP is currently under construction. Approximately 25% of this sub-set of packages have been successfully imported into the medium-term store.
* We have continued to engage and influence the timely delivery of the additional capabilities required to deal with the remaining sub-set (one third) of former Dounreay SNM packages that are subject to the regulatory issue.

Sellafield Ltd continues to make satisfactory progress with establishing a means for retrieval, overpacking and medium-term storage of acute risk SNM packages from a legacy (repurposed) SNM store. Sellafield Ltd has submitted a request for ONR’s agreement to release the related regulatory hold point 623 to allow it to implement its arrangements to commence retrieval operations. We are currently assessing Sellafield Ltd’s submission and will provide an update within the next WCSSG report.

The on-going construction of SRP is fundamental to the success of the SNM future state programme and forms part of our continued engagement with Sellafield Ltd to ensure the timely implementation of capabilities required for the safe longer-term storage of SNM inventory, including that which has been consolidated from Dounreay to Sellafield. In May 2025 the roof was sealed with a final concrete pour, making the main building watertight and ready for internal fit-out. ONR has informed Sellafield Ltd that it requires our permission prior to installing safety significant plant into the SRP building. Permissioning this stage helps to mitigate project risk and provides regulatory opportunities to influence the project before options are foreclosed. It is expected that Sellafield Ltd will submit a request for release of the related regulatory hold point 656 during the next WCSSG reporting period.

Sellafield Ltd is proposing to process a sub-set of the plutonium residues inventory via the existing route for management of plutonium-contaminated material (PCM). This would enable earlier progress with residues disposition and avoid the need for repackaging of these cans through SRP. A submission requesting our agreement to release hold point 620 to permit commencement of the retrievals was submitted in July 2025 which we are currently assessing and will provide an update within the next WCSSG report.

Following assessment, we gave agreement to the lifting of hold point 540 (see Section 4) to remove the final residual liquors from Finishing Line 5. Sellafield Ltd have subsequently transferred all final plutonium bearing liquors from the facility (pending verification).

Due to the progress of retrievals in a Legacy SNM Store and Finishing Line 3, we have approved declassification of both these facilities as Category I stores from a Nuclear Storage Security perspective.

Remediation Value Stream - Decommissioning Projects

Regulatory engagements continue with projects in remediation, which included

the glovebox demonstrator (developing an efficient and effective capability to semi-remotely decommission alpha-active gloveboxes using laser cutting technology). The project has been delayed as the permissioning of this activity was anticipated to take place in mid 2025. We have undertaken further engagements with the Sellafield project team to progress this work. As a result of our engagements, we anticipate the permissioning of this project to progress to active commissioning in mid November 2025.

We are continuing our engagement activities regarding the removal of the barrel section of the pile 1 chimney. Sellafield Ltd has undertaken trials in late 2024 which consisted of raising and lowering a specifically designed decommissioning platform onto a mock-up pile 1 Chimney. Sellafield Ltd anticipate that it will submit its safety case for assessment to ONR in March 2026 for permission to erect the SPIDA platform onto the Pile 1 Chimney and commence commissioning activities.

The Box Encapsulation Plant Product Store (BEPPS2)

BEPPS2 is a key new build project at Sellafield, which extends the capacity of the original BEPPS to support high hazard and risk reduction operation at site. Within the last WCSSG report we confirmed that we were engaging with the project ahead of the permissioning for commencement of construction during next financial year. We have now released a regulatory hold point that allows Sellafield Ltd to commence construction of BEPPS2 up to the point of active commissioning (see Section 4). The release of the hold point is to start construction activities only and this approach will not preclude further engagements or permissioning hold points up to and including active commissioning.

Leadership and management for safety

During this period, we continued our regulatory oversight of Sellafield Ltd’s Safety Improvement Plan (SIP). Sellafield Ltd has proposed changes to the SIP’s content, including the removal of the Organisational Learning workstream from its scope. We consider organisational learning to merit enhanced regulatory attention and are therefore seeking assurances from Sellafield Ltd that this important workstream will continue to receive appropriate senior management oversight.

We also maintained oversight of Sellafield Ltd’s efforts to strengthen the integration of behavioural expectations into performance management conversations and formal reviews. We judged that adequate progress had been made against the agreed actions, and as a result, we closed an associated regulatory issue. It is encouraging that Sellafield Ltd intends to sustain focus on this area through its People Strategy.

In this reporting period, Sellafield Ltd confirmed its intention to assess its safety culture in October and November 2025 using the Nuclear Industry Safety Culture Inventory (NISCI). NISCI offers a validated and reliable measure that, when combined with qualitative data, enables organisations to better understand their safety culture and identify targeted improvement actions. Wewelcome Sellafield Ltd’s early adoption of this tool and will maintain proportionate regulatory oversight of its implementation and outcomes.

Our inspectors continue to oversee Sellafield Ltd’s efforts to improve organisational capability management. While we acknowledge improvements in some areas, shortfalls remain in the arrangements for managing the nuclear baseline. Consequently, we will maintain our enhanced focus on how Sellafield Ltd demonstrates it has sufficient human resources to support safe operations. We have asked Sellafield Ltd to consider where ownership of LC 36 should reside within the organisation. Sellafield Ltd has confirmed that this is under active consideration.

We havealso continued our oversight of the Organisational Learning workstream, including a review of Sellafield Ltd’s arrangements for learning from incidents and several site visits to observe incident reporting and learning activities. We have informed Sellafield Ltd of our intention to conduct an inspection later in 2025 to evaluate the adequacy of its response to high-potential events on the licensed nuclear site.

In May 2025, an ONR inspector observed a meeting of Sellafield Ltd’s Nuclear Safety Committee (NSC), constituted under LC 13. The inspector found that the NSC operated in line with relevant good practice. Wecontinued to receive and review NSC meeting minutes throughout this reporting period.

Nuclear Site Health and Safety (NSH&S)

Sellafield Ltd continue to be in Enhanced Regulatory Attention for NSH&S across three areas:

1. **Safety Performance** - Delivery of Industrial and Fire Safety Improvements;
2. **Control of Hazards and Risks** - Maturity of NSH&S risk prioritisation and profiling; and
3. **Safety Leadership and Culture** – “Capable Organisation” and “Learning”.

Focus continues to be around key areas outlined below.

The NSH&S team continued their work regarding the enforcement action including the improvement notice served on Sellafield Limited due to breach of The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Regulations 2002 (as amended). The Improvement Notice requiring prevention or control of exposure to nickel nitrate was complied with during this period. See further details on our website:

[Sellafield Ltd complies with improvement notice | Office for Nuclear Regulation](https://www.onr.org.uk/news/all-news/2025/10/sellafield-ltd-complies-with-improvement-notice)

The NSH&S team continued to be involved in the improvement notice served on Sellafield Limited regarding breaches of The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 following investigation of the South Sidings rail collision. The improvement notice was complied with during this period(details below).

[Sellafield Limited complies with improvement notice | Office for Nuclear Regulation](https://www.onr.org.uk/news/all-news/2025/06/sellafield-limited-complies-with-improvement-notice)

The NSH&S team supported enquiries into Sellafield Ltd’s use of flexible lead shielding sheets, to ensure the coating of the flexible lead shielding sheets is maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order, in good repair and in a clean condition. An improvement notice was served (see section 4).

The NSH&S team has been considering Sellafield Ltd’s overall strategic approach to NSH&S management including their strategy; risk profiling and their management arrangements.

# Non-Routine Matters

Dropped can during movements – INF-5206

We undertook preliminary enquiries and a review of Sellafield Ltd’s Management Investigation report for an incident on 28 May 2025 where during routine can shuffling and swabbing operations, a Dounreay Exotics Storage Facility (DESF) can was knocked to the floor, a drop of 700mm. There were no safeguards, nuclear, radiological or security consequences as a result of this event. The incident was categorised against the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) as a Level 1 – Anomaly.

ONR issued an Enforcement Letter (see Section 4) which detailed a number of actions to bring the licensee back to compliance. A level 3 regulatory issue has also been raised to monitor the resolution of this shortfall, which is ongoing

SRP Construction Site - Accidental energisation of a 400V cable,

We undertook preliminary enquiries following an incident that occurred on the SRP construction site on 22 July 2025 where a circuit breaker locking device was insufficiently robust, had fallen off and when an operative attempted to reapply it, inadvertently energised a 400V cable which should have been isolated.

There were no serious consequences resulting from the event, no radiological doses to workers or the public, and there was no potential of a significant challenge to nuclear safety. However, there was the potential for injury to a worker. Sellafield Ltd is undertaking its own investigations which we have close oversight of and will use to determine the appropriate and proportionate regulatory response.

Encapsulation Product Store 1 (EPS1)

An incident occurred on 17 April in EPS1 where, during routine maintenance, a steel crane rope fell from height in an uncontrolled manner whilst workers were in the vicinity below. No injuries resulted and there was no risk to nuclear safety. We received notification on 25 April and preliminary enquiries were commenced later that day. A decision was taken to investigate the incident and Sellafield Ltd were informed of the decision to investigate on 22 May. The investigation is still on-going and a further update will be provided within the next WCSSG report.

Spent Fuel Services

There were several lifting equipment related incidents at the Spent Fuel Services’ Facilities which were followed up by the Site Inspector, one incident resulted in an enforcement letter (ONR-EL-25-014) being served in relation to access to an electric overhead travelling crane under The Work at Height Regulations 2005. Regulatory advice was also provided to Site in relation to LC28 following one of the incidents.

As a result of these lifting equipment related incidents, the Spent Fuel Services Operating Unit temporarily paused lifting activities to facilitate a safety reset, a decision supported by the Site Inspector; these activities have now resumed.

# Regulatory Activity

ONR may issue formal documents to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. Under nuclear site licence conditions, ONR issues regulatory documents, which either permit an activity or require some form of action to be taken; these are usually collectively termed ‘Licence Instruments’ (LIs) but can take other forms. In addition, inspectors may take a range of enforcement actions, to include issuing an Enforcement Notice.

**Table 1: Licence Instruments, Enforcement Notices and Letters Issued by ONR during this period**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Date | Type | Ref. No. | Description |
| 25 April 2025 | Hold Point Release | HPCP line 540 | Transfer of Residual Pu Liquors from FL5 to HAPW Z |
| 06 June 2025 | Improvement Notice | ONR-IN-25-16 | Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, Sections 2 & 3  Control of Lead at Work Regulation 2002, Regulation 8(1)(a)  Sellafield Ltd failed to implement measures to ensure the coating of the flexible lead shielding sheets is maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order, in good repair and in a clean condition |
| 30 June 2025 | Hold Point Release | HPCP line 650 | Lowering of the Harwell flask to ground |
| 8 August 2025 | Enforcement Letter | ONR-EL-25-014 | Fuel Handling Plant 15 tonne Crane Collision |
| 18 September 2025 | Enforcement Letter | ONR-EL-25-19 | Shortfalls highlighted regarding compliance with LC10, 12 and 36. |
| 25 September 2025 | Hold Point Release | HPCP line 651 | Regulator permission for the commencement of construction for the BEPPS2 Facility |

Reports detailing the above regulatory decisions can be found on the ONR website at <http://www.onr.org.uk/pars/>.

# News from ONR

For the latest news and information from ONR, please read and subscribe to our regular email newsletter ‘ONR News’ at <https://www.onr.org.uk/news/newsletter>.

# Contacts

Office for Nuclear Regulation

Redgrave Court

Merton Road

Bootle

Merseyside

L20 7HS

website: [www.onr.org.uk](http://www.onr.org.uk)

email: [Contact@onr.gov.uk](mailto:Contact@onr.gov.uk)

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