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Symptom Based Emergency Response Guidelines (SBERGs) for Heysham 1, Heysham 2, Hartlepool and Torness AGR Power Stations

Date released
25 July 2024
Request number
202405019
Release of information under
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA)

Information requested

May I request the Symptom Based Emergency Response Guidelines (SBERGs) for Heysham 1, Heysham 2, Hartlepool and Torness AGR power stations in pdf format.

Information released

We confirm that under s.1 of the FOIA, we hold the information you have requested.

In our previous correspondence to you, dated 28 June 2024, we set out that we were considering the public interest test in relation to the following exemptions of the FOIA:

  • s.24, Safeguarding national security;
  • s.26, Defence; and,
  • s.38, Health and safety.

S.24(1) provides that information which does not fall within section 23(1) of FOIA is exempt information, if exemption from section 1(1)(b) is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security (s1(1)(b) is the duty to communicate).

S.26(1) provides that information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice:
(a) the defence of the British Islands or of any colony; or,
(b) the capability, effectiveness or security of any relevant forces.

S.38(1) provides that information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to:
(a) endanger the physical or mental health of any individual; or,
(b) endanger the safety of any individual.
As each of the aforementioned are qualified exemptions, we are required to balance the public interest between disclosure and non-disclosure. We have therefore applied the Public Interest Test to each of the exemptions and have set out factors for and against disclosure below.

Exemptions applied

s.24, s.26, s.38

PIT (Public Interest Test) if applicable

Factors for disclosure (s.24, s.26 and s.38)

  • We are committed to being an open and transparent regulator. We will use openness and transparency to achieve our objective of developing and maintaining stakeholder trust in ONR as an effective independent regulator;
  • The public have a vested interest in issues related to the nuclear industry, facilitating accountability and transparency; and,
  • We understand that there is a public interest in information related to the measures, procedures and arrangements concerning public protection.

Factors against disclosure (s.24)

  • There is a strong public interest in safeguarding national security. The ICO guidance for s.24(1) makes it clear that safeguarding national security includes protecting potential targets even if there is no evidence that an attack is imminent;
  • The requested SBERGs are essentially blueprints containing critical information on emergency response plans in the event of a significant incident. As we must accept that a release of information under the FOIA is a release to the world at large, we must consider that there is undeniable potential for the information to find its way into the hands of persons or organisations with nefarious aims wishing to cause harm to the safeguarding and security of the nation. Such adversaries can be highly motivated and may go to great lengths to gather separate pieces of intelligence to attempt to expose vulnerabilities;
  • It is likely that the requested information, pieced together with seemingly harmless information readily available in the public domain, could provide malign actors a much larger picture of the sites, their security systems, and any potential vulnerabilities they may have; and,
  • As such, releasing such sensitive nuclear safety information (however seemingly harmless) to the world at large poses significant risk to the smooth-running of an emergency response. This would be likely to have catastrophic consequences, undermining responders efforts to control an incident during the implementation of emergency plans, leading to a delay in, or total failure of, the ability to bring an emergency situation under control.

Factors against disclosure (s.26)

  • The requested SBERGs are blueprints containing critical information on emergency response plans in the event of a significant incident. Making such sensitive nuclear safety information readily available to the world at large carries the inherent risk of it being acquired by malign actors which in turn poses significant risk to the smooth-running of an emergency response. If intercepted or disrupted, this would be likely to undermine the capability, effectiveness and security of any forces responding to the emergency as the plan will no longer be adequate or reliable, thus prejudicing the defence of the British Islands in such a situation.

Factors against disclosure (s.38)

  • The release of this information, should it be used nefariously could be likely to result in the inability to properly implement the emergency response which has been designed to protect health and wellbeing in the event of a nuclear incident, thus leading to the endangerment of public health and safety.

Conclusion

ONR is committed to being an open and transparent regulator and operates on the basis of openness with a presumption to disclose information. We understand that the public has a vested interest in the nuclear industry, particularly as issues related to the nuclear industry are subject to close scrutiny and debate, and we understand that there is a public interest in information related to the measures, procedures and arrangements concerning public protection.

On balance, the interests of national security, defence and health and safety outweigh the need for openness in terms of the specific information being requested. There is overwhelming public interest in ensuring that response tactics to a potential emergency incident at a nuclear site (or sites) are kept safe and free from public scrutiny to prevent it from being tampered with.

Therefore, after careful consideration of the factors set out above, we have concluded that the information should be withheld and that the disclosure of the information requested would not be in the publics best interest. There is a clear and overwhelming public interest in ensuring appropriate safeguards are in place in the event of an emergency incident, that the defence of the country is prioritised, and that the health and safety of the public is not in any way compromised.