

**ONR – NGO Forum  
Video conference meeting  
26 May 2021 (1300 – 1530)**

**Office for Nuclear Regulation present:**

Adrienne Kelbie (AK) – Chief Executive  
Mark Foy (MF) – Chief Nuclear Inspector  
Katie Day (KD) – Policy and Communications Director (ONR co-chair)  
Jane Bowie (JB) – Deputy Chief Inspector and Director, New Reactors Division  
Paul Dicks (PD) – Deputy Chief Inspector and Director, Sellafield, Decommissioning, Fuel and Waste Division  
Mike Finnerty (MFinn) – Deputy Chief Inspector and Director, Operating Facilities Division  
Steve Vinton (SV) – Deputy Chief Inspector and Director, Technical Division  
Rachel Grant (RG) – Head of Policy

**Environment Agency:**

Alan McGoff (AM) – Manager, Reactor Assessment and Radiological Monitoring Team

**NGO representatives present:**

Dr Jill Sutcliffe (JS) – Low Level Radiation and Health Conference (NGO co-chair)  
Katy Attwater (KA) – Stop Hinkley  
Sue Aubrey (SA) – Stop Hinkley  
Peter Banks (PBA) – Blackwater Against New Nuclear  
Prof. Andy Blowers (AB) – Blackwater Against New Nuclear  
Peter Burt (PB) – Nuclear Awareness Group/Nuclear Education Trust  
Paul Collins (PC) – Stop Sizewell C  
Rod Donington-Smith (RDS) – Cumbria Trust  
Alison Downes (AD) – Stop Sizewell C  
Rita Holmes (RH) – North Ayrshire Radiation Monitoring  
Alan Jeffrey – Stop Hinkley  
Tor Justad (TJ) – Highlands Against Nuclear Transport  
Sean Morris (SM) – Nuclear Free Local Authorities  
Ian Ralls (IR) – Friends of the Earth Nuclear Network  
Michael Taylor (MT) – Together Against Sizewell C  
Trish Whitham (TW) – Nuclear Information Service  
Pete Wilkinson (PW) – Together Against Sizewell C  
Chris Wilson (CW) – Together Against Sizewell C

**Guest attendees**

Professor Steve Thomas (ST) – Emeritus Professor of Energy Policy, University of Greenwich, London  
Tim Deere-Jones (TDJ) – Independent Marine Pollution Consultant

**ONR Secretariat:**

Daniel Jones – ONR Communications Manager  
Jean Taylor – ONR Communications Manager

## **1 WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS**

- 1.1 Katie Day (KD) welcomed everyone to the meeting, her first as co-chair. KD advised that the co-chairs had recently conducted a review of the Forum Terms of Reference to ensure it remained fit for purpose, which had been shared with Forum members for comment. KD also updated on the work being undertaken by the Safety Directors' Forum to produce a 'Good Practice Guide' for SSG/LLC/LCLC meetings, advising that the draft guide is now expected to be made available for feedback at the end of July. KD explained that the SDF had reported issues of low participation amongst SSGs. MF and KD advised that they are following up on this issue.
- 1.2 Mark Foy (MF) advised that he and KD are due to attend a meeting of the Stakeholder Group Forum (Chairs and Vice Chairs of SSGs) and would raise the concern of low engagement by SSGs with them.
- 1.3 KD also thanked Katy Attwater (KA) and Peter Burt (PB) for their contributions during the ONR meeting on 25 May regarding 'openness and transparency'. KD introduced Rachel Grant (RG), ONR's Head of Policy, and explained that RG would be assisting her with NGO matters following the departure of Adrienne Kelbie (AK). KD invited the Chief Nuclear Inspector to update the Forum.

## **2 UPDATE FROM THE CHIEF NUCLEAR INSPECTOR**

- 2.1 MF updated on the ONR leadership changes and shared a revised senior leadership team organogram to highlight these, explaining ONR's leadership structure now aligns with that of other nuclear regulators worldwide. MF explained that the appointment of Donald Urquhart as Executive Director of Operations and Sarah High as Deputy Chief Executive, would give him the capacity to look across all of ONR's business areas, when he takes up the combined role of Chief Executive/Chief Nuclear Inspector on 1 June 2021. MF explained that Sarah High in her role as Deputy Chief Executive would lead the work of ONR's support functions.
- 2.2 MF explained that the substantive leadership structure that is now in place owed much to AK's contribution. MF advised that NGOs should be assured that ONR will continue to engage with them and, maintain the openness and transparency that they have become familiar with under AK and Jill Sutcliffe's (JS) chairmanship.
- 2.3 MF introduced the three newly appointed Deputy Chief Inspectors to the Forum, Jane Bowie (JB), Steve Vinton (SV) and Paul Dicks (PD). All took the opportunity to introduce themselves to Forum members and to provide some further details on their regulatory background in ONR. MF advised that Dr Anthony Hart, ONR's current Technical Director would soon be retiring, and that Dr Mina Golshan, ONR's current Director of the Sellafield, Decommissioning, Fuel and Waste Division would be leaving ONR to take up a new position in industry.
- 2.4 Pete Wilkinson (PW) asked what this leadership reshuffle will do to the availability of information and greater openness and transparency.

- 2.5 MF advised he did not expect these changes to have any impact on the availability of information, explaining that ONR remained committed to a policy of openness and transparency.
- 2.6 KA asked for further information on the structure above ONR that connects the organisation to Government.
- 2.7 MF explained that the Department for Work and Pensions is ONR's sponsor department, adding that it is this sponsorship arrangement that enables ONR to maintain its independence from the nuclear sector. He advised that it is the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) which sets nuclear policy.

**Action 21.07** – KD offered KA a call to explain further how ONR engages with government.

[**Post meeting note** – KA contacted on 27 May 2021 and meeting took place with KD and RG on 8 July.]

- 2.8 Sean Morris (SM) asked why do so many ONR staff who leave ONR go into new the nuclear industry, citing a number of recent examples. SM asked if ONR could see how this was perceived by the NGO community.
- 2.9 MF recognised NGO concerns, but emphasised that the individuals mentioned had all moved into important safety roles in the industry and have served to improve safety management in the organisations they have joined. He added that all relevant rules and procedures that govern appointments outside of ONR had been followed.
- 2.10 Alison Downes (AD) asked about the Regulatory Asset Base model in relation to the proposed Sizewell C development. AD asked if the project is given the go ahead with a new funding model in place and EDF Energy becomes a minority shareholder in the development, who would ONR issue the site licence to.
- 2.11 MF clarified that if the project does proceed, NNB GenCo, would be the SZC site licensee. MF added that ONR has received a site licence application from NNB GenCo for SZC, which is currently being assessed. He added that ONR needs to be satisfied that the prospective licensee has the capability to discharge the duties required under the site licence. MF explained that there was a long way to go before this assessment is completed.
- 2.12 Andy Blowers (AB) asked if ONR had considered inviting a government minister to attend a future meeting of the Forum. MF and KD both agreed this was a good idea and confirmed that they would make enquiries with the DWP.

**Action 21.08** – ONR to explore possibility of inviting minister to attend a future meeting of the ONR NGO Forum.

- 2.13 Mike Taylor (MT) asked MF if he could provide assurance that ONR would not be in a potential conflict of interest position due to receiving money from developers and, requested a separate meeting with ONR to discuss ongoing issues/concerns regarding SZC (please see action 21.13). MF was clear that ONR is not constrained or impacted unduly and reassured MT that ONR would never find itself in a potential conflict of interest with any developer. He advised that ONR will always undertake

the activities it considers are necessary to regulate the industry and ensure its continued safety and security, charging it accordingly.

- 2.14 Ian Ralls (IR) returned to the issue of ONR staff leaving to take up positions in the nuclear industry – his concern being that their expertise leaves with them. He commented that in his experience there had been little crossover of staff between the Civil Aviation Authority and the aviation sector and noted the recruitment firewall between regulator and industry.
- 2.15 MF explained that ONR cannot constrain individuals and that ONR staff are free to leave and go and work where they wish, so long as they comply with the relevant requirements on leaving ONR.
- 2.16 MF moved to update on ONR's latest position/response to the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic. MF confirmed that ensuring safe nuclear operations has been ONR's priority throughout. He confirmed that ONR remains satisfied with the industry's response and that ONR is continuing to monitor the situation.
- 2.17 MF advised that ONR has also continued to focus on the health and well-being of its own staff and has continued to benchmark ONR's response and the UK position with fellow national regulators across the globe.
- 2.18 MF explained that ONR was now seeing a return to 'near normal' operations across all areas of its regulation, with updated guidance now in place for site inspections and antigen testing available to staff before site visits. In his update, MF also commented on the opportunities for new ways of working, based on learnings from the pandemic, and the post-incident review which ONR intends to carry out once the UK has emerged from the pandemic.
- 2.19 MF moved to update on the movement of higher activity waste from the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) to Sellafield, which ONR has recently permissioned. MF confirmed that up to 5,000 drums will be transported to Sellafield over the next 8 years, where it will be placed into storage pending long term disposal. MF advised that the first shipment of waste was successfully transported in April, explaining that this project is a key enabler to hazard and risk reduction on the AWE Aldermaston site. MF added that there is currently no intention for the waste to be returned to AWE at a later date.
- 2.20 SM asked how the waste will be transported, and Rita Holmes (RH) asked how the waste will be treated when it arrives at Sellafield.
- 2.21 MF confirmed that the waste will be transferred by road. MF added that at Sellafield there are waste streams that currently exist to treat this type of waste. MF confirmed that the drums will be compressed on arrival at Sellafield and stored awaiting long term disposal. He confirmed that ownership of the waste currently sits with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and AWE, but that this would eventually transfer to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA).
- 2.22 PW asked for clarity on the processing of the waste, if it would be over-packed, and if the security measures are appropriate. Peter Burt (PB) asked if the MoD will be covering the costs of treatment and storage of the waste or if this would be covered by the NDA; and also whether ONR accepts the 'proximity principle' that waste

should be treated and stored at the point of its generation. PB also asked if the regulatory decision/justification would be made available.

- 2.23 MF confirmed that the waste would be 'over packed' and placed into facilities that currently store similar types of waste. In response to the question from PB, MF advised that at Sellafield there is the expertise, technical understanding and treatment and storage facilities to deal with this type of waste, explaining that these were the reasons why Sellafield was considered the best solution.
- 2.24 PW followed up with further questions regarding the inventory of radionuclides in the waste and asked for further information.

**Action 21.09** – ONR to look at providing further details on the contents of the waste, and to consider sharing regulatory decision record relating to this matter.

**[Post meeting note - Details on contents of the waste and regulatory decision record shared with PW and PB on 17 June 2021.]**

- 2.25 Further questions were asked by PB about the security of the waste movement from AWE to Sellafield, and IR asked if the waste being transported from Aldermaston included components of decommissioned nuclear warheads.
- 2.26 MF advised that he expected the movement of waste to be done under civilian transport, which ONR would regulate. In response to questions on the inventory of the waste, he advised it was not appropriate to discuss at this meeting – but confirmed that the waste did not contain components from decommissioned warheads.
- 2.27 MF moved to update on the Hinkley Point C (HPC) silo collapse which occurred in June 2020. He confirmed that ONR took this incident very seriously and that we have engaged closely with the site licensee since the incident occurred. MF advised that ONR is satisfied with the licensee's response to the incident, which included a thorough investigation into the causes. He confirmed that the licensee intends to share findings more widely across the sector through the 'Collaborative Reporting for Safer Structures' network, so that others in the construction sector can learn from this event.
- 2.28 MF provided a summary of the key findings from the investigation report. He confirmed that the silo was not being used at the time of the failure; that there was no evidence of maloperation or misuse; that failure was likely to have occurred from overloading of a bolted joint in the cone section; and the cause of overload was due to poor design of the silo.
- 2.29 MF added that ONR is unlikely to take any further action regarding this event. He explained that there are no implications for the HPC permanent plant and no other similar temporary structures currently in use at the HPC site. He confirmed that ONR had engaged with the site over the last 11 months and has reviewed the investigation report and is satisfied that the licensee's investigation has been robust. He also confirmed that he is satisfied with the licensee's plans to ensure the learning from this event is shared with its contractors and more widely across the construction sector.

- 2.30 KA asked if ONR is satisfied with safety amongst contractors at the HPC site, and in the licensee's ability to check and monitor this.
- 2.31 MF advised that the safety performance of individuals and organisations that work on the HPC site are a major focus for ONR and that intervention plans include gaining assurance on both the quality of construction and safety related components and safety culture on the site. He confirmed that ONR undertakes work to ensure we are satisfied with the quality of components and culture at HPC and its supply chain organisations.
- 2.32 KA commented that it has been reported that up to 1,700 workers will be recruited into roles on the HPC site. KA expressed concern at the skill level and experience of potential new recruits in areas such as welding, noting particular concern regarding the availability of skilled electricians in the area.
- 2.33 MF advised that the competency levels of workers was a key area of focus for ONR, it is critical that the work being undertaken on site is done to the right quality by suitably qualified and experienced people and ONR seeks assurance of this.
- 2.34 MF moved to update on the situation at Sellafield following recent media reports alleging bullying, harassment and discrimination at the site. He advised some of the recent claims was new intelligence for ONR and that we responded quickly. MF stated that ONR takes this type of issue very seriously, due to the potential impact on safety and security culture on site – and the adverse effect on individuals. He confirmed that ONR has carried out a detailed intervention at Sellafield and has found no evidence of a link with safety and security performance on the site at this point in time. He advised that ONR judges that the measures that Sellafield has put in place to address such concerns through their Equality, Diversity and Inclusion programme are appropriate, and that these measures are supported by different groups across the site, including the BAME, LGBT+ and the network of Safety Representatives.
- 2.35 MF added that he was satisfied that there is no validity to the suggestion made by the BBC that safety might be affected at the site but emphasised that continued focus and commitment is required to improve the culture at the site. He confirmed that a Regulatory Issue has been raised and that ONR will follow up and continue to monitor this matter.
- 2.36 MF moved to update on the status of the reactors at the Hinkley Point B (HPB) and Hunterston B (HNB) sites. In relation to HNB, he confirmed that on 13 April, ONR permissioned both reactors to return to service for a limited period of operation. MF advised that Reactor 3 is currently operating, and that Reactor 4 is currently undergoing graphite inspections. He confirmed that both reactors will be shutdown permanently by 7 January 2022.
- 2.37 In relation to HPB, MF advised that ONR gave permission for Reactor 3 and Reactor 4 to return to service on 17 March. He added that EDF Energy has confirmed that both reactors will cease operating by 15 July 2022.
- 2.38 RH asked for further details on the core checks.

**Action 21.10** – ONR to provide further details to RH regarding core checks on HNB Reactor 4.

[**Post meeting note** – Email update issued to RH on 3 June 2021. ONR confirmed that the final core inspections of Reactor 4 at HNB have now been completed. Advised that the level of cracking observed in the core was within predicted levels and that the reactor was expected to return to service shortly.]

- 2.39 With regards to the core inspections, IR asked how sure we can be that a full picture of the state of the cores has/can be obtained.
- 2.40 MF advised that inspections were targeted at those areas where cracking was expected to occur. He confirmed that it is not possible to inspect all channels but explained that the data obtained from inspections is extrapolated to give an overall picture of the core state. He advised that the data is conservative as the inspections are targeted at high impacted channels.
- 2.41 In relation to Sizewell B (SZB), MF advised that EDF Energy are providing solutions to repair the thermal sleeves, which would allow the reactor to return to service.
- 2.42 AD asked how long ONR expected the current outage period to last. MT asked if there was any risk of a leak from the SZB reactor, and who would be responsible for decommissioning the site.
- 2.43 MF advised that it was not possible to say how long the current outage period would last, as this was dependent on EDF Energy finding a solution to deal with the thermal sleeve issue. MF added that there was no risk of a leak from the SZB reactor as the reactor is shutdown and depressurised, adding that the thermal sleeves are not part of the containment boundary for the reactor. In response to the question on decommissioning, he explained that EDF Energy would be responsible for defueling the site, advising that the site would then be handed over to the NDA for the decommissioning phase.
- 2.44 MF concluded by updating on the enforcement action taken by ONR since the Forum last met on 26 February. He confirmed that ONR has issued five enforcement letters, three to Sellafield and one each to NNB GenCo and to AWE. He also confirmed that ONR had issued a Direction to EDF Energy.
- 2.45 MT asked about the issues that remain outstanding following the Generic Design Assessment (GDA) of the EPR reactor design.
- 2.46 MF advised that not all issues had yet been closed out; NNB GenCo will gradually address the remaining outstanding issues as the site specific design is finalised.

**Action 21.11** – ONR to provide update to MT on number of issues that remain outstanding.

[**Post meeting note** - Response issued to MT on 27 July 2021 with further details.]

- 2.47 Tim Deere-Jones (TDJ) commented that since 2017, ONR and the Environment Agency have had no detectable engagement with EDF Energy's massive HPC related dredge and dump programme in Bridgwater Bay and the Bristol Channel.

TDJ asked why this was the case, and if it would remain the case, in light of the new proposals to dump radioactively contaminated waste at Portishead.

- 2.48 Alan McGoff (AM) advised that ONR and the Environment Agency were not the decision makers regarding the licensing of mud-dredging and disposal of dredged material from the Bristol Channel as part of the HPC works. He confirmed that regulatory responsibilities for these activities sits with Natural Resources Wales, who act on behalf of the Welsh Government, and the Marine Management Organisation (MMO). AM explained that the levels of radiation in the mud makes it out of scope, meaning it does not fall within the ONR/Environment Agency regulations under 'radioactive waste'.
- 2.49 TDJ advised that in earlier discussions dating back to 2012, following the issuing of the Design Consent Order for the development of HPC, the Environment Agency had recommended that the mud should be dumped in a deep water site in the middle of Bristol Channel – but EDF Energy ignored this. AM reiterated that the decision regarding this matter sat with the MMO.

**Action 21.12** – AM to follow up on this particular issue/concern regarding 'mud dumping' with TDJ post meeting.

### **3 WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR SMALL MODULAR REACTORS?**

- 3.1 JS thanked Professor Steve Thomas (ST) for agreeing to attend the Forum and invited him to commence his presentation.
- 3.2 ST commenced by highlighting some of the characteristics identified by Admiral Hyman Rickover (1970) between an 'academic' reactor and a 'practical' reactor, noting the difficulties/issues in building a nuclear reactor, that are often not considered until work commences.
- 3.3 ST provided an overview of the differences between Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), Advanced Nuclear Technologies (ANTs) and Advanced Modular Technologies (AMTs), noting that SMRs cover a range of different technologies. ST advised that the UK government invented ANTs to cover SMRs of whatever size, which would include the 470MW Rolls-Royce design.
- 3.4 ST gave an overview of what he considered to be the rationale in favour of SMRs. He explained that supporters of such technology claim that building components in large numbers on production lines will make them much cheaper, more than compensating for lost economies of scale; that doing more of the work in factories means quality is easier to control and schedules and costs less likely to overrun; and that building in clusters means capacity can be added incrementally according to demand needs, in turn reducing the levels of financing required.
- 3.5 ST moved to look at the Prime Minister's '10 Point Plan'. He provided details on the funding given to the Advanced Nuclear Fund, noting how this was set to be allocated. He commented that government was optimistic that SMRs would come online by the early 2030s.
- 3.6 ST moved to look at the Rolls-Royce SMR proposal, noting how this seems to be a Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) design. He provided further details on the



proposed reactor size, commenting on how the reactor if built, would be bigger than the first unit built at Fukushima and double the size of the Trawsfynydd reactors. ST also provided further details on the proposed cost of the Rolls-Royce SMR, commenting that it would cost £2bn to develop the design to point of ordering, then £1.8 - £2.2bn per unit.

- 3.7 ST updated on the proposed demands made of the UK government by Rolls-Royce and discussed the costs and timescales involved. ST commented that in his view, it would be hard to see how the proposed Rolls-Royce SMR could come online by the early 2030s.
- 3.8 ST concluded his presentation by providing an update on the NuScale SMR design. He noted how this was a PWR design, but much more advanced than the Rolls-Royce design, commenting that it had received major funding from the US government. ST advised that whilst the design received regulatory approval in the USA in 2020, there remain outstanding issues that have yet to be resolved.
- 3.9 JS thanked ST for his presentation and invited questions from the Forum.
- 3.10 Tor Justad (TJ) asked for clarification on the funding allocated by government towards the building of a fusion reactor, noting that much more would be required than the £222 million so far allocated, to build a plant of this type.
- 3.11 MT asked if ONR had decided on the siting criteria for a fusion reactor.
- 3.12 MF confirmed that ONR is involved in discussions with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) regarding the regulation of fusion. He advised that while ONR is one of the bodies being considered, he felt it was more likely that the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) would be asked to continue to regulate fusion, the technology falling under the current legislative framework under which HSE regulates.
- 3.13 Mike Finnerty (MFinn) added that the Regulatory Horizons Council has recommended that regulation of fusion remains with the HSE and Environment Agency. He advised that to make 'economic sense' it would be likely that any future fusion reactors would need to be much bigger in size. He added that radionuclides would be produced from such technology, so a robust safety case would need to be in place.
- 3.14 TJ asked if low level waste would be generated from fusion reactors. MFinn confirmed waste products would be generated from this technology which would need to be addressed, handled, and disposed of safely.
- 3.15 KD added that no decisions have yet been reached by government on who will regulate fusion but confirmed that ONR does have a 'seat at the table', given our experience with fission – and we expect that government will consult on this later in the year. NGOs will be kept informed of relevant progress.
- 3.16 IR asked why nobody was telling government that they were 'dreaming' with these proposals.

- 3.17 AB raised a concern that if SMRs are built in clusters, to deliver GW scale output – they would need to be built on existing sites, contrary to the flexibility argument the government makes around cost, size, and placement.
- 3.18 ST asked if ONR was likely to start a GDA of the Rolls-Royce SMR design in autumn this year, and whether GDA would still be appropriate, if more radical designs came forward.
- 3.19 MFinn confirmed that ONR has been engaged with Rolls-Royce for over two years, advising that the company had listened to ONR feedback and were aware of ONR’s regulatory expectations. He added that if the Rolls-Royce SMR design did enter the GDA process, he expected it would be a credible entry. He confirmed that ONR was expecting the Rolls-Royce design to enter the GDA process in the early part of 2022. MFinn explained that the GDA process would establish if the design could be built in the UK, adding that even if the GDA was successful, ONR would still need to licence a site before construction could commence.
- 3.20 In response to ST’s second question, MFinn advised that Advanced Modular Reactors (AMR) involving more novel technologies, are still a long way off. He confirmed that ONR had been provided with funding to upskill staff to ensure the organisation was on the ‘front foot’ if asked to regulate an AMR design, however, he felt it was still a number of years before a credible design was ready to be submitted to ONR for assessment.
- 3.21 JS thanked ST for joining the Forum and for delivering his presentation.

#### **4 FAREWELL TO ADRIENNE KELBIE**

- 4.1 As this was AK’s last meeting at the Forum before leaving ONR, JS took the opportunity on behalf of the NGO community to present her with a gift and to thank her for her commitment and service to the Forum and to ONR.
- 4.2 AK commented that she very much appreciated this and that it had been her pleasure to meet and engage with so many NGO colleagues during her time as Chief Executive of ONR.

#### **5 AOB**

- 5.1 PB explained that at the last meeting of the Independent Advisory Panel (IAP), of which he is a member, the topic of ethics in nuclear regulation was discussed. He advised that ONR had presented on the subject, and that both he and Dr David Lowry (a fellow NGO IAP member) had been asked to deliver a ‘deeper view’ at the panel’s next meeting on the topic of nuclear ethics. PB advised that he would like to gather views and feedback from the Forum and would be writing to members over the coming weeks.
- 5.2 AB stated he would like to know what had been discussed before he responds. MF responded that he is happy for the IAP paper to be circulated, and for AB to attend the IAP to contribute to the discussion. AB thanked MF and advised he would like to attend. JS also took opportunity to pay tribute to the work that the late Phil Davies had done in this area.

**Action 21.13** – ONR to arrange to share ‘ethics’ presentation that was delivered at the last meeting of the Chief Inspector’s IAP.

[**Post meeting note** – Copy of presentation shared with AB and PB on 30 June 2021.]

5.3 AB commented that in relation to the proposed Bradwell B development, NGOs felt concerned that ONR had not consulted on the GDA of the UKHPR1000 design, like the Environment Agency had done. MT also added that in relation to the proposed development at Sizewell C, he was concerned that EDF Energy had not placed sufficient information into the public domain.

**Action 21.14** – ONR agreed to consider whether a bespoke meeting is needed with interested NGOs on SZC and BRB, that covers new topics/questions and would not already form part of the existing Environment Agency led joint regulators meeting scheduled for September 2021.

[**Post meeting note** – After further discussions with MT it was agreed that a further meeting with Together Against Sizewell C would not be needed ahead of the joint regulators meeting in September 2021. A meeting with AB and other members of the Blackwater Against New Nuclear group has been scheduled for 27 October 2021.]

## **6 SUMMARY AND CLOSE**

6.1 KD and JS thanked the speakers and all attendees for their input into a productive meeting. JS and KD wished everyone well before bringing the meeting to a close.