

REGULATORY OBSERVATION	
REGULATOR TO COMPLETE	
RO unique no.:	RO-ABWR-0018
Date sent:	16 September 2014
Acknowledgement required by:	07 October 2014
Agreement of Resolution Plan Required by:	28 November 2014
Resolution of Regulatory Observation required by:	26 June 2015
TRIM Ref.:	2014/252937
Related RQ / RO No. and TRIM Ref. (if any):	
Observation title:	Examination, Inspection Maintenance and Testing (EIM&T) Isolations and Configurations
Technical area(s) Mechanical engineering	Related technical area(s) Radiation protection Conventional safety MSQA
Regulatory Observation	
<p>Summary</p> <p>This mechanical engineering regulatory observation is cross cutting and is being raised to ensure all the UK ABWR structures, systems and components (SSCs) examination, inspection, maintenance and testing (EIM&T) isolations and configurations are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. designed in accordance with UK relevant good practice (RGP); and 2. the optioneering risks have been reduced so far as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP). <p>Assessment Observation</p> <p>My assessment has highlighted an example of planned EIM&T with the reactor internal pump plug that relies on a single isolation seal for confinement. The single seal is the only design measure preventing active fluid that is under a significant hydraulic pressure within the reactor pressure vessel from leaking onto operators undertaking EIM&T activities in the drywell area directly underneath the reactor pressure vessel.</p> <p>I judge the reactor internal pump plug reliance on a single confinement measure be to a shortfall in the regulatory expectations of SAP series "EKP" key engineering principles. I consider the design has not been fully optioneered to reduce the risks SFAIRP.</p> <p>I consider this regulatory observation to be cross-cutting and of interest to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. conventional safety; 2. radiation protection; and 3. MSQA <p>In conclusion I consider:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. the RP's arrangements do not meet all aspects of UK RGP; 2. the reactor internal pump plug reliance on a single confinement measure be to a shortfall in 	

- regulatory expectations; as it does not reduce the risks SFAIRP; and
3. a GDA cannot be concluded without this assessment observation being adequately addressed in an auditable manner.

Regulatory Expectations

It is my regulatory expectation that the RP:

1. is able to demonstrate and substantiate that each UK ABWR mechanical engineering SSC:
 - a. is of an inherent safe design one that avoids radiological hazards rather than controlling them;
 - b. sensitivity to potential faults is minimised;
 - c. level of protection prevent faults, or if protection fails should ensure protection limits the potential consequences and prevent escalation; and
 - d. optioneering has reduced risks SFAIRP.
2. SSCs' EIM&T isolations and configurations are in accordance with UK RGP HSG253 "The safe isolation of plant and equipment (ISBN 978 0 7176 6171 8). Noting it is a principal regulatory expectation that "positive isolation" is provided for an SSC that is adjacent to an energised SSC.

Regulatory Observation Actions

The RP is expected to:

1. generate a resolution plan that will:
 - a. present its detailed strategy to demonstrate each mechanical engineering SSC EIM&T isolation and configuration design is aligned to UK RGP and the design has been optioneered to reduce the risks SFAIRP;
 - b. define and scope the planned activities;
 - c. include a controlled programme identifying: planned activities; deliverables; milestones; timescales and resource requirements; and
 - d. provide the audit trail to each revised SSC design.
2. identify all the applicable UK RGP codes, standards, guidance and legislation;
3. identify all the mechanical engineering SSCs that need to be reviewed;
4. review its extant design process arrangement against the stated expectations;
5. make available to ONR the review conclusions, implications and recommendations;
6. if appropriate:
 - a. raise design changes; and
 - b. update its design process arrangement, the UK ABWR safety case, system designs and substantiation; and
7. provide progress updates to ONR through the planned engagements; and
8. make available any appropriate updated documents and substantiation for ONR assessment.

Actual Acknowledgement date:	
RP stated Resolution Plan agreement date:	