**Minutes of the ONR NGO Forum**

**16 November 2022**

**Novotel, Manchester**

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| **In Attendance (ONR):**  Katie Day (KD) - Director of Policy & Communications (ONR co-chair)  Mark McAllister (MMc) - ONR Chair  Mark Foy (MF) - ONR Chief Executive/Chief Nuclear Inspector  Paul Fyfe (PF) - Director of Regulation, Civil Nuclear Security and Safeguards  Mike Finnerty (MFinn) - Director of Regulation, Operating Facilities Division  Rachel Grant (RG) - Head of Policy  John Turner (JT) - Principal Nuclear Safety Inspector  **Environment Agency:**  Alan McGoff (AM) - Manager, Reactor Assessment and Radiological Monitoring Team  **Observer:**  Prof Sharon Clarke - University of Manchester  **Secretariat:** Daniel Jones - Communications Manager  Enid Lovelady - Communications Officer | **In Attendance (NGO):**  Dr Jill Sutcliffe - Low Level Radiation and Health Conference (NGO co-chair)  Jean Allen - Bradwell B Action Network  Sue Aubrey (SA) - Stop Hinkley  Katy Attwater (KA) - Stop Hinkley  Peter Banks (PBa) - Blackwater Against New Nuclear  Prof. Andrew Blowers (AB) - Blackwater Against New Nuclear  Peter Burt (PB) - Nuclear Awareness Group  John Busby - Low Level Radiation and Health Conference  Paul Collins (PC) - Stop Sizewell C  Neil Crumpton (NC) - People Against Wylfa B  David Cullen (DC) - Nuclear Information Service  Stephen Dewick (SD) - Bradwell B Action Network  Rod Donnington-Smith (RDS) - Cumbria Trust  Alison Downes (AD) - Stop Sizewell C  Alan Hatt - Together Against Sizewell C  Rita Holmes (RH) - Ayrshire Radiation Monitoring Group  Allan Jeffrey (AJ) - Stop Hinkley  Tor Justad (TJ) - Highlands Against Nuclear Transport  Richard Outram (RO) - Nuclear Free Local Authorities  Ian Ralls (IR) - Friends of the Earth Nuclear Network  Pete Roache (PR) - Nuclear Free Local Authorities  Mike Taylor (MT) - Together Against Sizewell C  Pete Wilkinson (PW) - Together Against Sizewell C |
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|  | 1. WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS     1. Katie Day (KD) and Dr Jill Sutcliffe (JS) welcomed everyone to the Forum. As there were some new attendees to the Forum, JS invited everyone to introduce themselves. KD also reviewed the action log, noting that action 22.03 was the only action open; she confirmed that ONR would ensure NGO members are notified once the Sizewell C (SZC) assessment reports are published.    2. KD provided a short update on the tragic event at Hinkley Point C (HPC) on 13 November 2022, which resulted in a worker on the site losing their life. KD explained that Avon & Somerset police currently had primacy over the matter and so ONR would not be commenting further at this time. The latest position is available on the ONR website. 2. Chief nuclear inspector’s (cni) annual report    1. Mark Foy (MF) explained that the CNI Annual Report was a yearly publication that looked at the overall performance of the nuclear industry. MF advised that whilst there had been some variability in performance, overall he was satisfied that the nuclear industry has achieved the high standards of safety, security and safeguards compliance that ONR expect.    2. MF noted the three themes that ONR wanted the industry to focus on over the coming year, these being: management of ageing facilities; conventional health and safety; and leadership and culture in safety and security, including for cyber.    3. In relation to the management of ageing facilities, MF noted that there are many ageing facilities on nuclear sites, and he referenced the CNI themed inspection on the management of ageing facilities, which ONR would be publishing shortly. MF explained the importance of ensuring resources and funding were made available to maintain the ageing facilities across licensed sites.    4. In relation to conventional health and safety (CHS), MF noted there did need to be improvements across industry in some areas, such as electrical safety. He confirmed that ONR was carrying out targeted interventions and that ONR was committed to bringing senior leaders from across the sector together to look at what improvements could be made.    5. For the leadership and culture theme, MF noted that leadership was vital to ensuring the safety and security across the industry, and this would be a focus of ONR over the coming year.    6. MF noted examples of ‘good practice’ across the industry which the report had identified. He referenced innovation, noting how industry had started to lead in collaborative work to identify topics and initiatives for discussion. He also reflected on some of the key achievements across the industry over the preceding 12 months, referencing the final shutdown of reactors 3 and 4 at Hunterston B; Imperial College research reactor delicensing; and highly active liquor stock reduction at Sellafield, which were now at their lowest levels.    7. MF commented on the external environment which ONR was operating in, noting: the ongoing conflict in Ukraine; cost of living crisis and resilience of supply; British Energy Security Strategy ambitions; funding for major projects; capacity and capability; and climate change. MF advised that in relation to Ukraine, ONR was providing support to the UK Government as necessary. He also noted that capacity and capability was a significant issue across the industry at the present time.    8. MF confirmed that the next CNI themed inspection report would focus on climate change, explaining that ONR would look at licensed sites to gain further assurance that they would be safe from the potential impacts of climate change.    9. In his closing remarks and summary, MF noted the following points: the nuclear industry has demonstrated resilience in relation to the pandemic; over the last 12 months there has been good performance across the industry; themes highlighted in report show areas that need collective attention; the operating environment is dynamic - shown by the pandemic, Ukraine and subsequent impact; and that ONR will continue to modernise to ensure it delivered effective and efficient regulation.    10. Rod Donnington-Smith (RDS) asked if there would be any revisions to ONR’s regulation of the nuclear industry based on what’s happening in Ukraine. Questions were also asked about terrorism and use of drones.    11. MF advised that no nuclear facilities were designed to withstand ‘war conditions’. He confirmed that there were discussions amongst the international nuclear regulatory community about this, and that there was a degree of confidence that nuclear facilities could withstand certain ordnances. MF confirmed that ONR does consider security threats as part of its regulation.    12. Paul Fyfe (PF) added that no site security plan was designed to withstand ‘war’, but they did need to be able to deal with terrorist threats. In relation to drones, PF advised that, currently, commercial type drone capability does not pose a significant security threat. However, much work is being done by HMG and its agencies around counter-drone capabilities and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary are actively involved in such work.    13. John Busby (JB) asked about the continuous supply of diesel for standby generation at sites, noting some concerns about that. He asked if it was time to think about how we can ensure standby generation was maintained.    14. MF advised that ONR will look at this as part of safety case assessments. He also advised that each site must also undertake a periodic safety review (PSR) and as part of that review, they need to consider and demonstrate appropriate standby generation.    15. Neil Crumpton (NC) commented that the government response to war in Ukraine has been to say we need more nuclear energy, noting that he did not consider that the security angle had been understood by government. He asked if ONR could make clear to government that no nuclear facility is designed to withstand ‘state on state’ action. Peter Burt (PB) added that it was entirely feasible that within the lifetime of a nuclear facility there could be war which could result in a nuclear facilities being attacked. He asked if this should not be considered as part of the Generic Design Assessment (GDA).    16. MF advised that further consideration is needed internationally, including any standards that may be necessary.    17. Mike Taylor (MT) commented on the current nuclear siting policy. He noted that four sites were in high-risk flood zones and felt that pressure needed to be applied to government to change policy. He asked if ONR could commit to revisit siting policy.    18. MF advised that government identified eight potential sites a number of years ago. He confirmed as part of our regulation ONR would look at a proposed site and if we didn’t consider it was safe or secure, we would not permission any new build activities on that site. KD added that ONR is engaged with government regarding siting policy.    19. Tor Justad commented that in the CNI Annual report (para 3.17) it noted the leading role ONR has played in ensuring the UK understands and manages the cyber security risks of the new European Train Control System (ETCS). TJ asked why we were following European rules.    20. PF advised that this was a widely used system and that there were no other such systems.   **Action 22.06 – ONR to provide further details on ETCS.**  **Post meeting note -** The European Train Control System (ETCS) is a signalling and train control component of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) that is being deployed across the rail network in Europe to improve train safety and increase the capacity of the rail network. In the UK, ETCS is being implemented as part of the digital railway program, which aims to increase the capacity and efficiency of the rail network by using digital technologies to improve train control and signalling.  Network Rail in England and Wales will gradually migrate to digital signalling technology and trains need to interact with this. All train operating companies, including Direct Rail Services (DRS), must implement on board technology to do so. This is a UK rail network matter for which ONR has been highlighting cyber security considerations, rather than ONR imposing European rules on DRS.  As such, in ONR's capacity as the independent regulator for civil nuclear security in the UK, a remit which includes both transport security, cyber security and information assurance (CS&IA), we have been engaging with key stakeholders to ensure that dutyholders subject to The Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 understand and are appropriately managing any security risks of implementing ETCS.   * 1. In relation to Dounreay, TJ commented that 75% of the fuel had now been removed from the site and asked what the timescale was for removing the remaining 25% of the fuel.   2. MF confirmed that this was an ongoing piece of work and at this time was unable to provide firm dates on when this was likely to be completed.   3. Prof. Andrew Blowers (AB) commented that in relation to small modular reactors (SMRs) and siting, he was unclear what ONR’s position was. He commented that potential sites proposed for Rolls-Royce SMRs had not been tested, and that there were concerns about certain sites and the impacts climate change could have on them. He noted that government had not issued an updated siting strategy.   4. MF advised that government needed to decide on the exact role of SMRs. Once that is clear, the siting will then need to be reviewed; he confirmed that ONR would ensure the regulatory position was communicated and understood.   5. David Cullen (DC) asked for clarification on when the review into regulatory attention levels takes place. Mike Finnerty (MFinn) advised that ONR needs to see sustained improvement across a site over a period of time before its regulatory attention changes. MF added that attention levels are normally reviewed every 12 months.  1. UPDATE FROM ACROSS ONR    1. MF introduced the session by providing an update on the latest developments across ONR’s new reactors division. He noted that ONR had not yet issued a site licence for the SZC development, as there were still some issues that needed to be resolved to ONR’s satisfaction before a licence could be granted.    2. In relation to the UKHPR1000 reactor design, MF advised that he did not anticipate this technology being deployed across the UK. He confirmed that ONR was currently undertaking a GDA of the Rolls-Royce SMR design which he expected could take up to four years to complete.    3. MF updated on the formation of Great British Nuclear (GBN), noting that GBN would look at a range of matters, and that ONR was engaging to ensure that regulation was being considered. Efficiency in regulation and greater international collaboration were themes highlighted in the British Energy Security Strategy. He noted that ONR was already collaborating with international partners, and it drives organisational efficiency as part of its continuous improvement as a public body.    4. MF advised that a report from GBN has been submitted to the Prime Minister for consideration. MF noted the complex fiscal environment in the UK and its potential impact on government spending plans.    5. NC noted that SMRs were not ‘small’ and that it would be helpful if we could refer to them as modular reactors. AB asked further questions about siting, noting that the strategy for the deployment of SMRs seems to be to place them on existing sites.    6. MF noted the point about SMRs and added that the technology needs to be credible before it could even be considered for deployment to a site.    7. Pete Wilkinson (PW), in relation to site licensing, noted that ONR would not licence a site until it was satisfied it was ‘safe’. PW asked what the definition is of ‘safe’.    8. MF confirmed that ONR would only issue a site licence if it was satisfied that the proposed licensee could fulfil its obligations under the site licence. He acknowledged that further engagement by ONR with local communities might be helpful to explain its judgements and decisions in relation to safety.    9. Alison Downes (AD) asked how people could be guaranteed that the issues concerning Sizewell B (SZB) and the proposed SZC development have been addressed.    10. MF advised that the issue in question had been identified by ONR and that the prospective licensee must demonstrate to ONR they can resolve it. MFinn added that licensing a site does **not** mean approval to construct a reactor.    11. AD advised that she had been made aware that resolving issues could be very expensive. AD noted that public money may be needed to address and resolve issues. MF advised that there was still sufficient time for issues at SZC to be resolved. He confirmed that ONR was working with NNB GenCo to understand their thinking, and that ONR would raise concerns with them if necessary.    12. Katy Attwater (KA) noted the delays in the construction of HPC, which she said was 10 years behind schedule. MT commented how the SZC development still required over 100 construction permits to be issued by the Environment Agency (EA). He commented that the current planning regime allowed a Development Consent Order (DCO) to be granted **without** knowing if the project was achievable.    13. Alan McGoff (AM) advised that the DCO sets out the planning intent for the site, and that the Secretary of State had considered that the outstanding issues could be resolved.    14. PF joined MF to provide a brief update on recent media coverage concerning the number of security related inspections carried out by ONR. He noted that the coverage had shown a reduction in the number of inspections during the pandemic period.    15. PF explained the reasons for this, noting that a lot of ONR’s assessment work to review and approve security plans is desk-based, and therefore would not be captured in inspection numbers. He confirmed he was content with the regulatory focus that ONR was placing on security. He acknowledged that there has been an increase in the number of security related incidents reported to ONR, which indicated a growing awareness of security matters.    16. Richard Outram (RO) asked about the media reports of ONR using out of date security Technical Inspection Guides (TIGs) and Technical Assessment Guides (TAGs).    17. PF advised that on each TIG and TAG a review date is placed on the front cover of the document, but it doesn’t mean that the document is out of date at that point. Given ONR is currently conducting a review of its security assessment principles (SyAPs), the review of the relevant / associated TIGs and TAGs were temporarily paused. The outcome of the SyAPs review will then inform the TIG/TAG reviews accordingly. This has now been clarified on the ONR website.    18. MF then provided an update on the developments at Taishan following the fuel failure issues. MF confirmed that ONR was liaising with the French and Chinese regulators. He confirmed that there was an understanding of what had failed, but work was ongoing to establish a clear understanding of the root cause.    19. MF advised that the full lessons need to emerge from Taishan to understand what action may need to take place at HPC. He advised that ONR needed to understand what the cause of the flow issues was. He noted that the fuel design at HPC was different to that at Taishan.    20. AD asked about ONR’s relationship with other regulators. Paul Collins (PC) expressed concern about the EPR design questioning if it had fundamental design issues. He also questioned if the GDA process was appropriate and whether it was appropriate to grant a site licence to SZC, and asked if the GDA for the EPR should be revoked.    21. MF explained that the EPR constructed at Taishan was ‘first of a kind’ but advised that he did not believe the issues experienced at Taishan to be insurmountable.    22. PC noted that modelling did not identify issues at Taishan. KA also raised concerns and noted the significant impacts that could have occurred at Taishan.    23. MF advised that in the first few years of operation of a reactor, you would expect to see opportunities for learning. He confirmed that ONR would ensure that any learning from Taishan is considered at HPC.    24. Ian Ralls (IR) commented that vibration in water fuelled reactors has been known for decades and expressed concern that modelling had not identified this. MF reiterated that ONR needs to understand the root causes of what led to issues at Taishan in the first instance.    25. Further questions followed relating to Taishan and the GDA of the EPR design. AD requested that ONR be more pro-active about sharing information relating to Taishan and noted that the GDA that was completed for the EPR design was 10 years ago; NC asked about ONR’s legal position if the GDA for the EPR was revoked.    26. MF advised that the GDA of the EPR design was complete. He confirmed that ONR would need to be satisfied before hold points would be released on the pre-construction safety report. MFinn added that GDA does not have legal standing; he confirmed that the **legal process commences** once a site licence has been issued.    27. MT asked about the test sea wall around the SZC site and asked who would be monitoring the results of the trials and tests. MF advised that ONR would be working with NNB GenCo to look at the results of the tests and trials.    28. MF updated on ONR’s new policy for openness and transparency with interested stakeholders and the public, noting it set out new engagement and consultation approaches ONR is intending to adopt. KD added that ONR would welcome NGO feedback on the policy, which is open to public consultation until 16 December.    29. KA noted that the nuclear industry was a powerful lobbyist, commenting that NGOs don’t have that influence, and noting a recent select committee hearing which took evidence from supporters of nuclear energy. KA advised that NGOs need ONR to speak up for them.    30. KD confirmed that ONR expected to attend the select committee hearing in question in the new year. KD assured KA that ONR would speak out on matters that concerned us, or where there was misinformation in the public domain. PW added that he felt the language used by regulators should acknowledge limitations.    31. MF then updated on the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill and what this means for ONR. He confirmed that ONR is engaged with this work, and that it was our intention to ensure that the legislation relevant to ONR’s work is kept. KD added that ONR was working with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and reiterated point that ONR was working to ensure legislation that maintains the high standards of safety in the UK is retained.    32. PB asked what ONR’s plan ‘B’ was if the matter is not resolved at the end of the ‘sunset’ period. PB encouraged NGOs to raise this matter at their local SSG/LLC/LCLC meetings.   **Action 22.07 – ONR to ensure progress on the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill are included in future update notes to the Forum as necessary.**   1. Climate change workshop update    1. KD provided a brief update to the Forum on the climate change workshop that took place on 4 October, noting this was the first workshop of this type and that ONR would be looking to hold workshops to explore regulatory processes. The next step was for ONR to provide a response on the NGO papers presented at the workshop, ahead of considering future objectives and arrangements. MF added that he had found the workshop useful and that it was the start of a new engagement approach for ONR and that he hoped this format would allow key regulatory topics to be looked at together in depth.    2. KA advised that she had appreciated the support in helping to organise the workshop and that they would be looking for future events to be independently facilitated, noting that the group was working on two possible options for a future workshop. 2. Update on AGR FLEET    1. Richard Outram (RO) was invited by the co-chairs to provide an update on the recent meeting between ONR and Nuclear Free Local Authorities (NFLA) and to highlight to the Forum some of main concerns that the NFLA had regarding the AGR fleet.    2. RO noted that they had held a productive meeting with ONR. He advised that the main points of concerns that the NFLA had highlighted to ONR, were potential government lobbying; that the plants are ageing; they are all operating beyond their intended operational lifespan; equipment is failing, such as the onload refuelling facility and boilers; ageing means more graphite core cracking, particularly in the keyways; their failure could mean that there is difficulty in inserting control rods; the weight of the graphite core is also reducing over time as graphite oxidises; and there is increased instances of unplanned outages. RO noted the time that each of the operating reactors had spent offline in 2021, highlighting the increase across the fleet.    3. He advised the Forum that ONR had explained in the meeting that it was **not** the number of cracks that determine safety, but their nature, and ensuring that cracking did not cause debris that could impede the insertion of control rods for safety. RO advised that he had been reassured by ONR that there was an increased monitoring and sampling regime across the fleet to monitor the reactor cores.    4. MFinn advised that ONR’s view on extending the reactors at Hinkley Point B (HPB), which had been the subject of media coverage, was that any restart would need to be supported by a robust safety case.    5. MT noted that SZB was due to have its next outage in February2023 and issued a reminder that the PWR design also has issues. MFinn responded and confirmed that next year SZB was due to have its periodic safety review, which would provide the safety justification for continued operation.    6. AB questioned ONR’s role once the AGRs closed. MFinn advised that once the reactors have stopped operating, a defueling safety case will need to be provided to ONR for assessment before defueling could commence. He confirmed that once fuel had been removed from each reactor, responsibility for that reactor and site would be passed to Magnox. He confirmed that all Magnox sites remain under ONR’s regulation.    7. PB commented that a number of reactors were approaching the end of their operating life and asked what ONR would do if they were put under pressure by government to extend an operating period. He suggested ONR might want to ‘war game’ this scenario. MFinn confirmed that ONR would make its decisions based on safety and use ALARP principles.    8. TJ asked if there had been any discussion about extending the life of Torness. MFinn advised that the declared date to cease operating was 2028.    9. IR asked about how active graphite would be dealt with at the sites. MF responded by confirming that all low-level waste will be removed and stored, noting that Magnox will need to have procedures in place to break up the waste.    10. Questions were asked by John Busby (JB) regarding use of boron balls in relation to future AGR safety cases; Rita Holmes (RH) asked if EDF would be able to extend the limit of graphite cracking.    11. MFinn confirmed that boron balls could be used to shut down a reactor. In relation to graphite cracking, he advised that ONR was interested in the types of cracking e.g., keyway root cracking could lead to multiple cracking. RH questioned how ONR could say a reactor was safe with so many combinations of cracks.    12. MFinn expressed view that looking at the number of cracks in the graphite core was not helpful, and something ONR was trying to move away from in its communication.    13. JS observed that in Sweden NGOs were more involved in the decision-making process. 3. ONR and ethics    1. PB was invited by the co-chairs to commence his presentation. PB advised that this topic had first been raised at an Independent Advisory Panel meeting and that he had been asked to deliver a presentation to the Forum on ethics within regulatory decision making.    2. PB made the following observations: nuclear technology poses significant risks of harm to humans and the environment which are unevenly distributed over space and time and have long-lasting and uncertain impacts; ethical issues are usually side-stepped in nuclear policy and decision-making; and as a public body, it is important that ONR operates and is seen to be operating to high ethical standards.    3. PB suggested that ONR's current view of its ethical responsibilities are largely based around the legal framework through which the organisation operates. However, he noted that an ethical approach to decision-making is not the same as a legalistic approach to decision-making.    4. PB highlighted some examples of ethical approaches across the nuclear sector, noting the first Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) and the Ministry of Defence Submarine Dismantling Project. He commented that these approaches went beyond scientific analysis, economic, and legalistic criteria to one which emphasised justice, equity, human wellbeing, and long-term perspectives.    5. PB noted that there were a number of issues facing ONR which had an ethical dimension, notably: the implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission 2019 recommendation on provisions for consultation; licensing for a Geological Disposal Facility; and GDA and licensing for SMRs and advanced nuclear technologies.    6. PB highlighted key ethical principles, including respect for life, concern for well-being, ensuring justice and fairness, respect for dignity and liberty. He also discussed different ethical dimensions, including intertemporal equity, spatial equity, societal equity, environmental equity and intergenerational equity.    7. In relation to ethics and nuclear policy, PB suggested that government decision making tends to be based around economic wellbeing. However, he suggested this approach was not suitable for decisions relating to nuclear technologies where situations are complex, risks and uncertainties are high, and consequences extend into the far future.    8. PB suggested NGOs consider that ONR should adopt an approach to making key decisions which recognises uncertainty and the importance of ethics; is based around a deliberative process of stakeholder participation; and is seen to be fair and able to accept differing values and approaches. PB acknowledged this would pose challenges for ONR. He made a number of suggestions for ONR, including to learn from others grappling with ethical aspects of technology; focus on making processes and procedures fair and open; influence others to take an ethical approach; and commence a high-level conversation about nuclear ethics within ONR.    9. Following the presentation by PB, each table was invited to consider the following questions:   **1)** What do you think about what you’ve heard from PB? (all tables)  **2)** How could ethical decision-making work in practice for the regulatory decisions associated with a Geological Disposal Facility? (tables 3,4)  **3)** What engagement/involvement processes have you seen work well elsewhere which allow ethical matters to be addressed, and how might ONR adopt/use these in the future? (tables 1, 2, 5)   * 1. **Group 1**: In summary, the group reported they were very supportive of ethics and considered that the paper produced by PB had helped to stimulate discussion. They considered the paper was broad and that it might be helpful to focus on fewer areas. More generally they noted there were opportunities for ONR to improve its engagement with certain communities. They also judged ONR needed to have an appreciation of the ‘external world’ which may be against nuclear power. In relation to question three, they noted the work done by CoRWM and the approach taken in Germany towards nuclear power, as being examples of ‘good practice’ which ONR could learn from.   2. **Group 2**: They reported it was important to identify those areas that do involve ethics, such as legacy waste. They commented that it was important for Nuclear Waste Services to be engaged. Another area commented on was health impacts of uranium mining. In response to question three, this group identified the submarine dismantling process as an example of ‘good practice’.   3. **Group 3**: Overall they concluded there was an opportunity for ONR to be more pro-active and less passive regarding certain issues. The group commented that ONR should be more open to using its voice/expertise to raise/comment on issues that may sit outside its regulatory vires, but which ONR may judge need to be addressed.The group also emphasised the importance of early engagement and questioned if ‘social licensing’ should be considered by ONR.   4. **Group 4**: The group concluded that political considerations dominate. In relation to question two, the group said ensuring communities were adequately consulted and were not ‘bullied’ into a decision was vital.   5. **Group 5 (Zoom attendees)**: General view from this group was that ethics should be given a higher priority.They commented that they felt ONR should be proactive in correcting misinformation, and that ONR needed to ensure that when it was engaging with communities it did not use jargon.They also suggested ONR needed to rise above strategy and economics when engaging with government policy/decision makers.   6. Following the discussion and feedback, MF thanked PB and all attendees for their contributions. MF advised that ONR would now distil the feedback provided to consider next steps and report back. He noted specifically that ONR needed to engage more widely on certain topics/in certain locations.The climate change workshops would be an initial step on that journey.  1. Future onr ngo fORUM ARRANGEMENTS    1. The co-chairs invited Forum members to suggest ideas on future disucsison topics/arrangements for the Forum.The following suggestions/ideas were put forward:  * Face to face meeting in Suffolk to focus on the proposed Sizewell C development. * Siting of nuclear reactors looking specifically at the role of ONR. * Storage of waste on nuclear licenced sites. * Stakeholder engagement and what ‘good’ looks like, including what lessons can be learned from others to inform a future ONR approach. * New nuclear technologies. * Regulation of defence sites, with the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator invited to join a meeting; and to hold a dedicated session on defence sites in Berkshire. * Follow up session on Safety Directors’ Forum ‘Good Practice Guide’ for SSG/LLC meetings. * International perspective on engagement. * The characterisation of ‘risk’ in ONR guidance. * Uranium security and fuel supply.   **7 Close and summary**   * 1. KD announced that this would be her last meeting co-chairing the Forum as she would soon be leaving ONR to take up a position outside the organisation. KD thanked the Forum and expressed how much she had enjoyed working with NGO colleagues.Thanks were expressed to KD by attendees for her work to support the Forum over the previous five years.The co-chairs thanked all attendees for joining the meeting and wished everyone a safe onward journey.   The meeting closed at 15:15. |
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